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Iranian Ulama & the CIA: The Key Alliance 
Behind the 1953 Iranian Coup D’état 
By Anthony Lucey 
 
 
Abstract:  Much of the anger and hatred that is a part of US-
Iranian relations, which has exploded onto the world stage since 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979, stems from the 1953 coup d’état 
which removed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq1 
from power. A large field of scholarly work has been dedicated to 
the 1953 coup, specifically surrounding the participation of US 
and British intelligence. However, one interesting and surprising 
aspect of the 1953 coup which has not been sufficiently 
investigated is the role of Iranian religious clerics, known in Iran 
as the ulama, in assisting the CIA and their Iranian sub-agents in 
carrying out the overthrow of their own country’s democratically 
elected prime minister. As new documents are released, we can 
refine our understanding of the complex dynamics and array of 
participants in this event. Further illuminating this history is 
particularly relevant because it is the ulama that leads the 1979 
Revolution and establishes a new government. 
 
 
 
 
It is August 19, 1953 in Iran’s capital city of Tehran. 
Demonstrators are in the streets looting, rioting, chanting, and 
protesting. Beautiful mosques, main government and office 
                                                
1 Various spellings of the name Mohammad Mossadeq are used in this article. 
All references made by the author are spelled as above, but spellings used by 
other scholars (when quoted or in the titles of their work) may differ, most 
common being the spelling Mosaddeq. 
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buildings are being demolished and a local Tudeh (Iran’s 
Communist Party) theater and office equipment are burned to the 
ground. The demonstrators continue their march and attack local 
newspaper offices, leaving them in ruins. Trucks and buses now 
arrive flooding the streets with local tribesmen from surrounding 
areas who join the madness. The will of the people becomes too 
much, and soon the occupying army units join the movement. 
Civilians and soldiers, side by side, proceed to take over the main 
squares of the city and ultimately seize the broadcasting facilities 
of Radio Tehran. This historic Persian city has officially erupted 
into total chaos. Tremendous fear from local families caught in the 
fray fills the air. The demonstrations seem to have taken on a life 
of their own as they continuously grow in size. The mob moves on 
to take over the telegraph office, the foreign ministry, press and 
propaganda bureau, the police and army headquarters. Finally, they 
come to the home of the man who is the ostensible cause for all of 
the mayhem, their Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. A 
battle breaks out between Mossadeq's supporters and the anti-
Mossadeq crowds, leaving hundreds of people dead on the streets. 
The overthrow is now complete, and later the same day Army 
General Fazlollah Zahedi announces that he is Iran’s new Prime 
Minister and that his forces now control the city.2 At the time, and 
for many years following the coup d’état which overthrew Prime 
Minister Mossadeq almost no one, outside of British and US 
intelligence and their Iranian operatives and collaborators, would 
have ever dreamed that this horrific scene was entirely fabricated, 
designed, and orchestrated by a new world power—the United 
States of America and their top intelligence agency, the CIA. Hard 
to believe as it might be, this is no movie scene, but a sad narrative 
that lies at the heart of modern US-Iranian relations. 
This research seeks to shed light on the relationship 
between the CIA and prominent Islamic religious figures and their 
participation in the 1953 Iranian coup. This work will draw much 
                                                
2 Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup 
in Iran." Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (2013): 20. 
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of its information from declassified CIA documents like CIA 
Operative Dr. Donald Wilber’s contemporary historical account 
titled “Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 – 
August 1953,” CIA Historian Claud Corrigan’s “The Battle for 
Iran,” CIA Staff Historian Steve Koch’s more recent CIA history 
titled “Zendebad Shah!,” as well as the newly declassified British 
memorandums titled “Persia: Political Review of the Recent 
Crisis,” which provides key information regarding the payoffs of 
Iranian clerics by the CIA as well the expectations the CIA held for 
those clerics in return for said payoffs, the actions taken by both 
the CIA and key members of the Ulama, and the roles played by 
prominent groups and individuals throughout the major sectors of 
Iranian society. This research aims to deepen and enhance our 
understanding of the inner workings of the CIA, their role within 
the unfortunate tale of the 1953 coup, the motivating factors 
behind the CIA involvement, as well as the contributions of Iran’s 
own religious elites towards the toppling of Dr. Mossadeq.  
The first portion of this research will provide a deep 
historical context of the events leading up to the ousting of Prime 
Minister Mossadeq from office with the aim of providing sufficient 
background to facilitate the understanding required to make sense 
of this complicated course of events. First, it is necessary to return 
to the beginning in1901 with the notorious D’Arcy oil concession 
of Iranian oil rights to the British, continue into the early 1950s 
with the nationalization of Iranian oil, and conclude with the 
unfolding of the coup itself. The second portion of this study will 
focus on Mohammad Mossadeq himself, providing a background 
on the type of man he was and the positions he stood so strongly 
for. In this section we will also look into why the US and Britain 
both wanted to remove Mossadeq and their motivations for 
conducting the coup. This segment also aims to cover the regional 
and economic goals desired from the removal of Mossadeq and the 
consequences that followed. The third section of this paper will 
provide a background on the ulama, their role within Iranian 
society, and possible motivations for their participation in the 
coup. Section four will inquire into the relationship between the 
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CIA and members of the Ulama as well as their direct involvement 
through forming and implementing anti-Mossadeq street 
demonstrations, by using their influence in the political realm in 
Iran, in exchange for bribes in the form of cash as well as potential 
backing for power positions within the Iranian government, and by 
filtering “black” and “gray” propaganda through the mosques and 
their religious circles in hopes of toppling Mossadeq. This research 
will also help to show the inner workings of the CIA at this time 
and other activities they carried out in congruence with ulama 
networking and bribery that facilitated the coup. Lastly, I will 
introduce and analyze the primary source documents from the CIA 
and British Intelligence (MI6) that give context to the entire 
process of the coup as well as irrefutable, incriminating evidence 
of the CIA utilizing money to bribe influential Iranian clerics into 
participating in the 1953 Iranian coup.   
This work could not come at a time of greater importance 
in regard to current US-Iranian relations and is necessary to 
highlight the gravity of the effects that the decisions of today’s 
American leaders might have on Iran’s people, just as the decisions 
made by those in power back in 1953 have continued to have 
unforeseen consequences over the last 66 years. Current US regime 
change efforts in Venezuela should be viewed in much the same 
way, with the understanding that such efforts will carry with them 
their own set of long-lasting undesirable results. According to 
United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when discussing 
current US efforts in Iran, “It’s not about changing the regime, it’s 
about changing the behavior of the leadership in Iran to comport 
with what the Iranian people really want them to do.”3 While 
current US leadership under the Trump administration knows the 
history of the 1953 coup in Iran and the tremendous blowback it 
has caused well enough to know to change their verbiage when 
publicly discussing their current attempt at regime change in Iran, 
                                                
3 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Pompeo: U.S. Looks to Change Iranian 
Behavior, Not Regime” (May 25, 2018). https://www.rferl.org/a/pompeo-u-s-
looks-to-change-iranian-behavior-not-regime/29251208.html 
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their actions and their intentions have changed very little. This is 
not surprising as the current leadership in Iran was born out of the 
1979 Revolution which itself came out of the ashes of the CIA-led 
1953 coup. This has further entrenched both sides against one 
another and has created an unending closed circuit of hatred and a 
distaste for coming to a mature, mutual understanding. The United 
States is continuing their aims to control Iranian Oil through the 
use of extremely harsh sanctions and by stopping the majority of 
Iran’s oil clients from doing business with them. Through this kind 
of an economic chokehold the US hopes to make life so miserable 
and unbearable for the Iranian people by causing mass forced 
starvation and a total depletion of life’s necessary resources that 
the Iranian citizens will rise up and overthrow their current 
government themselves. So, while the United States may not 
openly admit to attempting to force a regime change in Iran, this is 
without a doubt their one true goal.4 We may not know exactly 
how today’s actions against Iran will play out over the coming 
years, but we do have the ability to use 1953 as a lesson which if 
understood correctly, could drastically and positively change and 
even save the lives of the Iranian people today and could shape 
future US-Iranian relations for many generations to come.  
While the 1953 coup was born out of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
crisis, it is necessary to go back a further 50 years and examine 
British-Iranian history to find its roots. Coming second in size and 
breadth only to the Reuter concession of 1872, a British oil 
prospector named William Knox D’Arcy was responsible for one 
of the largest and internationally most significant purchases of 
natural resources in world history, known as the infamous D’Arcy 
Concession of 1901. D’Arcy made an agreement with the Iranian 
monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, for the exclusive rights to explore, 
extract, refine, and export all oil products that spanned the entire 
nation of Iran for the next 60 years, with the exception of a few 
                                                
4 If this route were to be successful, the United States would be able to push the 
blame onto the actions or inactions of the regime leadership, rather than where it 
should be; on the United States government. 
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small regions bordering Russia.5 The shah handed over all of his 
country’s rights to what would become their largest and most 
valuable resource for only £50,000 directly into the shah’s pocket, 
another £20,000 in shares to be spread amongst other key Iranian 
political elites, and an agreement to pay the Iranian government a 
total of 16 percent of net annual profits. It wasn’t until 1908 that 
oil was first discovered in Masjed-e Suleiman in the province now 
known as Khuzestan. Not long after oil was struck, D’Arcy 
decided to sell his rights to the Burmah Oil Company, controlled 
by representatives of the British government, which later took on 
the name of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).6 
At this time in history, as it still is today, oil became of the 
utmost importance to the British. Unable to produce oil of their 
own, the British, led by the “oil maniac” Lord Admiral John 
Fisher, were set on converting the British Navy away from coal 
power to petroleum power.7 With these changes in mind, the 
British were able to secure 52.5 percent of the voting rights within 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Along with majority voting 
rights, the British government held two director positions within 
the company, giving them the right to veto any decisions made by 
the Board of Directors.8 With what amounted to basically full 
control over the APOC, the British were set to reap tremendous 
profits from Iran’s oil since they could control the price and 
output.9 In 1912 the British entrenched themselves even further 
into the region by linking their major oil well in Masjid-e Suleiman 
with a pipeline to an island in the Persian Gulf known as Abadan.10  
The British were able to convince the chief of the largest Arab-
                                                
5 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 13. 
6 Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.-
Iranian Relations (New York: New Press, 2013), 18. 
7 Ibid., 5. 
8 Ibid., 18. 
9 The higher the output of oil by the British government means the lower the 
price, therefore even though they are still profiting, Iran is getting fewer 
royalties and more resource exploitation. 
10 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 13. 
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speaking tribe in all of the southwest region, Sheihk Kha’zal, the 
leader of Abadan, to allow them to build the largest oil refinery in 
the world, allowing Britain to turn Iranian oil into a major export 
sector. The APOC quickly began producing more than 357,000 
barrels of oil per day, cementing themselves within the rankings of 
the Seven Sisters of oil who held a virtual monopoly over the 
worldwide oil industry.11 This resulted in more than £24 million a 
year in taxes and £92 million in foreign exchange for the British 
and as figured by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Abadan 
refinery alone was bringing in more than $347 million per year.12 
These numbers greatly eclipsed what the Iranian government was 
receiving in the form of taxes, royalties and profit sharing. 13 
Not surprisingly, the success of the APOC and the British 
in the mass production of oil within Iran began to cause some 
serious public discontent, but with the Abadan oil refinery 
producing enough fuel to cover 85 percent of Britain’s Royal Navy 
and Royal Air Force’s needs in Asia, public discontent would 
hardly be enough to stop the British imperial enterprise.14 Not only 
were the Iranian people angered by the negligible profits they were 
being given by the British from the production of Iranian oil, while 
the British government and the APOC’s investors were raking in 
tens of millions of pounds per year, they were also tired of the 
racism and exploitation of Iranian locals working for the APOC by 
the British management and leading officials. They were refused 
full-time positions and instead were hired as temporary contract 
laborers to limit job security. Iranian workers were forced to live in 
Shantytowns, while the European employees enjoyed superior 
housing. The Iranians were looked down upon and referred to as 
“wogs,” a derogatory and racist British term and were also kept out 
of management positions. Iranian anger and frustration continued 
                                                
11 The Seven Sisters of the oil industry consisted of: Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, 
Gulf Oil, Texaco, British Petroleum, and Shell. 
12 Abrahamian, The Coup, 18. 
13 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 14. 
14 Abrahamian, The Coup, 19. 
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to build as they realized they had no real control or say over their 
country’s most valuable resource.15 Iran was going through an 
immense economic collapse and the Iranian people were greatly 
impoverished, as the British continued to collect most of Iran’s oil 
profits. ARAMCO reaching a 50/50 deal with Saudi Arabia in 
December 1950 would be the last straw for Iran.16 In 1951, with 
their unrest boiling over, the Iranians turned to their members of 
Parliament, who in turn looked to Mohammad Mossadeq to do 
something about their predicament.17 
By the time he had taken power as Prime Minister in 1951, 
he was already an elderly man at seventy years of age and had 
been a member of the Iranian Parliament, known as the Majlis, for 
many years. Mossadeq was a strong believer in the power of 
parliament and the checks and balances this placed over the Shah’s 
control. In his eyes, the Shah was meant to reign over Iran, but not 
to have unlimited power and control. He also believed that the 
police and military were meant to serve the people, not the Shah. 
In fact, his goal was to limit the authority of the Shah, and to move 
the majority of power to the Majlis. He fought for constitutional 
democracy and stood for freedom of the press, something he knew 
would never be possible under the total control of the Shah.18 
Mossadeq was intensely opposed to British Imperialism and was a 
prominent Iranian Nationalist with a proven track record. He was 
considered an incorruptible man by his contemporaries, known for 
being relentless in his aspirations, maintaining unwavering 
positions regardless of risk, for being truly stubborn in his efforts 
to improve his country, and for working towards Iranian prosperity 
and independence with a vision based on Iran first, all else second.  
                                                
15 Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of 
Middle Eastern Terror (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 2. 
16 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power: with a 
New Epilogue (Free Press, 2009), 432-437. 
17 Kinzer, All The Shah’s Men, 2. 
18 Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq 
Government,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, eds. Mark 
Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, 126-177 (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2004), 127. 
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Western-educated and with a deep understanding of 
Western politics, Mossadeq was a very Westernized individual, but 
strongly rejected the Western policies of imperialism and foreign 
intervention, especially in his beloved homeland.19 Much of 
Mossadeq’s policy and the motivation behind his actions stemmed 
from the British and Russian occupation of Iran over Iranian Oil, 
not once but twice, in less than a fifty-year period. Sharing in the 
feelings of his fellow countrymen, Mossadeq was ready to end this 
pattern. In 1949 he began constructing a plan to nationalize Iran’s 
oil industry and headed an alliance known as the National Front, 
which consisted of Majlis from most of the political parties within 
Iran, including a prominent member of the Ulama, known as 
Ayatollah Sayyed Abol Qasem Kashani. While constructing his 
plan for the nationalization of oil, Iranian anger toward the APOC 
gained strength and momentum. The British finally agreed to 
renegotiate the terms of their concession agreement to increase 
Iran’s portion of the APOC profits from the 16 percent they were 
getting to about double that, but these actions proved to be too 
little and much too late.20 ARAMCO, the American owned oil 
company working in the Persian Gulf, negotiated 50/50 concession 
deals with both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their oil rights. This 
meant that ARAMCO would keep 50 percent of their profits and 
give 50 percent to each accordingly.2122 Mossadeq and the Majlis 
                                                
19 Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and 
Spooks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 11. 
20 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 38. 
21 Abrahamian, The Coup, 20. 
22 Venezuela had also reached a 50/50 split deal with the United States in 1943 
on the production of their oil. Much like Iran today, Venezuela is also suffering 
the effects of harsh US sanctions affecting their ability to export oil in an effort 
to remove President Nicolas Maduro and change the regime, just as they did 
with the 1953 Iranian coup. In an interview with Fox Business, US National 
Security Advisor John Bolton made the intentions of the US clear when he 
stated: “We’re in conversation with major American companies now. I think 
we’re trying to get to the same end result here. … It will make a big difference 
to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies 
really invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.” 
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fought for a 50/50 agreement in Iran, but the British thought this to 
be ridiculous and much more than they were willing to offer. 
Mossadeq and the National Front would not sit by and allow this to 
go on. On April 30, 1951, the Majlis voted Mossadeq in as the new 
Prime Minister of Iran. It was only one day later, on May 1, 1951, 
that Prime Minister Mossadeq officially nationalized Iranian oil, 
seizing Britain’s most profitable business in the world.23 
 As expected, the British were outraged with this 
course of events and were determined to return to the way they 
were pre-Mossadeq. Britain openly and publicly rejected Iran’s oil 
nationalization as completely illegal, as they believed that they had 
a valid contract with Iran for their oil, and had built, invested in 
and ran the oil field operations. The British first tried to fight 
Mossadeq at the United Nations and the International Court of 
Justice, but both attempts were unsuccessful. Britain proceeded to 
withdraw their advisors from Iran, froze Iranian funds from being 
converted in English banks, and issued harsh sanctions against the 
country.24 The British then took things much further, and 
introduced gunboat diplomacy by sending warships into the 
Persian Gulf. They set up a blockade so that any Iranian oil that 
was shipped out would be stopped and confiscated as the 
possession of APOC and Britain. They also made an agreement 
with the other major powers of the oil world, stating that none of 
them would step in and enter an agreement with Iran to purchase, 
process, or ship their oil. Both APOC and ARAMCO agreed to 
increase their oil production two-fold in Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia in order to offset the missing oil from Iran. This had severe 
negative effects on Iran’s economy by reducing their oil 
production from 241.4 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million 
barrels in 1952, and their oil income to almost nothing. The Soviet 
Union saw this as a possible opportunity to form an alliance with 
Mossadeq and the nation of Iran and offered their support for his 
                                                
23 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 39. 
24 Abrahamian, The Coup, 47. 
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nationalist views.25 Soviet support would prove a crucial 
component in the way the remainder of this story unfolds.  
While both the United States and Britain were worried that 
the Iranian nationalization of oil could result in a weakened ability 
to control worldwide oil prices and would give Iran the power to 
hold onto its oil and control worldwide prices it was Britain who 
was far more concerned with turning back the hands of time than  
the United States.26 The British knew that they would need US 
cooperation and backing against Iran to regain control over their 
oil. Unfortunately for the British, US President Harry Truman was 
more or less opposed to imperialism and the old way of doing 
things. Truman urged the British earlier on to come to a 50/50 deal 
with Iran, which was now too little, too late, but he himself did not 
like the idea of full nationalization of Iran’s oil industry as he 
believed this would have disastrous effects for the US and Britain 
around the world concerning other peripheralized oil-producing 
nations. Though keen on having the British come to an agreement 
with Iran, Truman remained opposed to the use direct military 
force and the use of covert operations to bring down Premier 
Mossadeq.  
Nevertheless, at this time the US government was focused 
on the Cold War and American society was experiencing the 
height of the Red Scare and McCarthyism. The main concern for 
the US was not so much Britain’s plight over oil but was focused 
on Soviet influence in Iran and their potential for becoming a 
Communist country. Luckily for the British, Truman was coming 
to the end of his final term in office, and would soon be replaced 
by President Eisenhower. Britain rather brilliantly decided to play 
upon the fears of the United States and especially President 
Eisenhower, who was at the same time being influenced by the 
new Secretary of State, and anti-communist hardliner, John Foster 
Dulles. With the economic situation in Iran deteriorating, the US 
believed that Mossadeq could inadvertently allow Iran to slide into 
                                                
25 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 40-41. 
26 It is important to remember that the US has indigenous sources of oil but 
Great Britain has none. 
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the Communist camp and could be replaced by a leader of Iran’s 
Communist Tudeh Party. Unlike the Americans, the British 
believed that if Mossadeq was removed there was a good chance 
that they could implement a pro-Western conservative government 
led by an Iranian monarch, but they would need the Americans 
help to accomplish this..27 Britain then began implementing their 
scheme of using American panic and frenzy revolving around 
Communism against them. According to British Intelligence Agent 
C.M. Woodhouse: 
 
I went to Washington with the permission of 
Anthony Eden, and I put it to the Americans that 
there was a very serious Communist threat against 
Iran. The Americans were not hard to convince. 
There was a general fear of Communism in the 
early 1950s which it was not hard to play on.28 
 
This approach was incredibly effective and helped move 
Eisenhower into an anti-Mossadeq position. Eisenhower then 
agreed to enter into a joint CIA-SIS operation under the codename 
TPAJAX to support the opposition movement in Iran and take out 
Mossadeq. The American and British led 1953 coup of the 
democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran had officially begun 
on July 11, 1953.29  
 
The Role of the Ulama in Iranian Society and their Motivation 
for Participation in the Coup 
 
Iran offers a long, rich, and complex history of religious 
development and spiritual teachings dating back to pre-Islamic 
                                                
27 Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow,” 154. 
28 William Cran and Daniel Yergin. “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, 
& Power.” YouTube Video, 44:06, July 8, 2016, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM7O3rbgqxc&t=2761s. 
29 CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, 
November 1952-August 1953," by Donald Wilber (March 1954): 18. 
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times, some of whose ideas have continued into and influenced 
Islam today. From Zoroastrianism to Manichaeism, much of Iran’s 
religious background and conditioning is based upon a dualistic 
struggle between the forces of good and evil, represented by a 
good deity and an evil power, where good is meant to be 
victorious. This theme of righteous warfare between good and evil, 
or justice and oppression, along with the exaltation of martyr 
figures, are found in pre-Islamic religions and have held their place 
in society well into the modern Islamic period. It took a number of 
social revolts at the beginning of the Islamic period in the seventh 
century to combine these pre-Islamic ideas with Islamic beliefs.30 
These fundamental beliefs are so infused within Iranian society 
because they mirror the daily struggle of injustice and inequality 
faced by the middle and lower classes of Iran throughout much of 
their history and provide much of the motivation necessary to give 
one’s life for a cause.  
However, it was not until the arrival of the Prophet 
Mohammad in early seventh century Arabia that politics and 
religion became intertwined, with a number of his revelations 
being political or legal in form. It was around this time, during the 
second half of the seventh century that Islam spread to Persia, but 
it would not be until the sixteenth century that Shia Islam would 
become the official state religion.31 Within Iranian society Ulama 
members have the responsibility to handle matters concerning 
Islamic law and education, providing them with further social 
control, but more importantly greater reliance on them by Iran’s 
citizens. This reliance on religion and the Ulama by the Iranian 
population for spiritual, economic, and social guidance and 
prosperity has placed enormous power into the hands of Iran’s elite 
religious clerics. They are looked to as force of good against the 
evil oppressors, whomever they may be at the time. This, 
                                                
30 Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive 
History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 2-7. 
The revolts were often carried out by the descendants of Ali or by men who lead 
revolts in his name, against the Umayyad caliphs.  
31 Ibid., 5-9. 
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especially because they are Shiites, is why it is so shocking to find 
out that a number of these religious elites, who their people trusted 
and relied on so heavily to act in their best interests, worked hand 
in hand with the CIA, in exchange for bribes of money and 
political positions of power, to overthrow Iran’s Prime Minister 
who was dedicated to bettering the lives of his people.  
 
Shia Islam  
 
Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D., the 
Islamic community split into two groups based on who they 
believed to be the next valid leader. One group chose 
Muhammad’s close friend Abu Bakr and the line of Caliphs that 
followed. This community became known as Sunni Muslims. The 
other group believed that the line of succession should have passed 
to Muhammad’s descendant, his cousin and son-in-law Ali, this 
group became known as the Shiate Ali (partisans of Ali) later 
shortened to Shia Muslims. After Ali’s death his firstborn son 
Hasan resigned from his position of authority, and Ali’s second 
son Hosain claimed this leadership role, but was soon thereafter 
massacred by armed forces of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid in 680 
A.D at Karbala, Iraq. One of Hosain’s sons survived the massacre 
and was able to continue on the line of Imams, which is the 
honorific title given to this line of descendants of Mohammad.32 
The son of the eleventh Imam following this line of descendants 
one day suddenly disappeared and went into occultation. The 
followers of this line are known as “Twelvers” and believe that the 
twelfth Imam will one day reappear similar to the Judeo-Christian 
messiah.33 Following the occultation of the twelfth Imam, it is 
                                                
32 Ibid., 6-7. 
33 Ibid., 7-8. A split occurred with the sons of the Sixth Imam, Ja’far as-Sadeq, 
where one group of Shi’is followed one of his son’s name Isma’il, and this 
group became known as the “Seveners.” The other group decided to follow 
another of Ja’far’s sons and believed that the infant son of the Eleventh Imam on 
this line of succession, who had disappeared, went into was is called 
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believed that there is no infallible interpreter or leader until his 
return when he is to come back and bring with him perfection and 
perfect justice.34 There was a strong belief within the Islamic 
community of Iran that the Imams held far greater knowledge and 
power than did any government or political ruler, leading to the 
belief that members of the Ulama, in the absence of the twelfth 
Imam, are far more qualified to interpret the will of the Imam than 
any political ruler can ever be, giving religious rulers great 
political influence and control.35 The disappearance of the twelfth 
Imam allowed the community to be quiescent generally as they 
would accept and support royal, local, political, and military rule 
until his coveted return. 
From the time of Mohammad there were three primary 
sources where Muslims could find answers to the everyday 
problems pertaining to social, political, and legal life. The first and 
most authoritative option was the Quran itself, which is understood 
as the word of God, which came down through the Prophet 
Mohammad himself. The second source is known as the hadith, 
which are the recorded words and practices of Mohammad 
throughout his life. The third option was to listen to the consensus 
of the leading Islamic scholars and jurists. These three sources 
covered many of life’s issues, but there were many parts of modern 
life that were not necessarily covered in the Quran or the hadith. 
Without a living Imam to provide infallible instruction to the 
people, how were they meant to handle many of life’s most 
important issues while staying true to their faith? How were they to 
interpret these divinely inspired sources, the Quran and hadith? 
This problem led to the creation of a specialty within Islamic 
scholarship, mujtahids (members of the Ulama trained to interpret 
the Quran and hadith), who are scholars and theologians who 
possess high levels of intelligence and have dedicated their lives to 
religious training and study, making them the most qualified to 
                                                                                                         
“occultation” in the ninth century, leaving not another Imam, but rather four 
interpreters of his will.  
34 Ibid., 8. 
35 Ibid., 9. 
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provide judgments on a wide range of topics.36 Originally there 
was quite a strong alliance between the mujtahids and the political 
leaders, but this would not last due to the increasing wealth and 
power of the Ulama.  
Within the Muslim world there is a process where a person, 
upon death, can leave their property or can offer it as a charitable 
donation to the “church”, in what is known as a vaqf, or an 
inalienable endowment that cannot be taken or taxed by the 
government. Charitable vaqfs, usually in the form of land, are 
given to help fund and run schools, hospitals, mosques, and any 
other institution, which are run by the Ulama.37 Even the private 
vaqfs that are given must go through the Ulama, who are paid 
through the vaqf revenues. As the government cannot ever seize 
these contributions, the wealth and power in the hands of the ulama 
grew greater along with their spiritual and legal duties and 
responsibilities. This placed the Ulama in a position where they 
could potentially challenge the authority of the government and 
had the backing to do so.38 On top of the vaqfs the Ulama also 
controlled religious taxes and performed community services for a 
fee like weddings, that did not have to go through the government. 
These funds were meant to go strictly to helping the poor and 
running the welfare institutions but in reality increased the wealth 
of the religious classes dramatically.39 With this wealth and new 
independence from the Iranian government, the power of the 
mujtahids grew even further as they gave the people interpretations 
of religious law in response to the problems of modern life that 
were so desperately needed.40 The Ulama almost effectively made 
the Shahs and Iranian leadership unnecessary in the lives of the 
regular everyday people in Iran, as they received most of what they 
needed both physically and spiritually from their religious leaders. 
                                                
36 Ibid., 10. 
37 Ibid., 16. 
38 It is important to note that the traditional Twelver Shiite tradition historically 
valued supporting the monarchy as opposed to anarchy.  
39 Ibid., 16-17. 
40 Ibid., 18. 
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The power and influence held by the Ulama within Iranian society 
had been set in stone from this point on. 
 
Development of the Coup  
 
Arguably the most important religious figure, who was very 
politically involved during the 1940s-50s, and a part of 
Mossadeq’s National Front, was the fervently anti-British 
Ayatollah Sayyed Abol Qasem Kashani. Kashani was the speaker 
of the Majlis and at first a close colleague of Mossadeq’s.41 He 
maintained a growing influence with the Iranian people, especially 
after the oil crisis, and was known to have ties to a terrorist 
fundamentalist group by the name of the Feda’iyan-e Islam.42 
Kashani had a long history of what was considered subversive 
behavior by the British and well as the Pahlavi regime. He took 
part in the 1920 Shi’a Revolt against the British as a young man, 
was arrested by the British for having links to the Germans in 
1944-45 and was arrested once again in 1946 for organizing 
protests in opposition to the rigging of the fifteenth Majlis 
elections. In 1949, Kashani was arrested after his photographer 
shot Mohammad Reza Shah, injuring but not killing him, and was 
later exiled to Beirut. Kashani was not allowed back into Iran until 
June of 1950 after he won a seat in the sixteenth Majlis. Even 
though he was in exile for some time, Kashani still maintained his 
connections and influence over the Tehran bazaar.4344 
                                                
41 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 43-44. 
42 Keddie and Richard, Roots of Revolution, 129. Founded in 1945, the 
Feda’iyan-e Islam were a small group of young, extremist, fundamentalist 
terrorists who assassinated those they believed to be enemies of Islam.  
43 Abrahamian, The Coup, 30. 
44 Keddie and Richard, Roots of Revolution, 30. The bazaaris, who are the 
merchant class, are a very prominent and influential group within Iran. The 
wealth and international ties of the elite bazaaris, who conducted cross-border 
trading, and the power of the guilds representing the local artisan shopkeepers 
gave the bazaaris a great deal of weight in Iranian society. Many of the bazaaris 
and members of the Ulama even came from the same families. With religious 
observance being extremely important within the bazaar class much of the 
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While playing the role of religious leader on the outside, 
the controversial cleric was not opposed to breaking his assumed 
moral code when it came to maintaining his power or increasing 
his bank account. After Ahmad Qavam failed to take control of the 
Majlis, Mossadeq’s political influence was stronger than ever. 
Using this power and popularity, Mossadeq moved to limit his 
former supporter, Kashani, and his ability to intervene in his plans. 
Kashani, as well as his close allies and influential members of the 
National Front, Baqa’I and Makki, began to see their political 
influence slip away.45 These three men, along with a few of their 
allies came together and created a parliamentary group whose aim 
was to limit Mossadeq’s authority. In January of 1953, Mossadeq 
asked parliament to increase his legislative powers for another 
year, which would allow him to issue reforms immediately without 
going through parliament. Kashani took this opportunity to fight 
Mossadeq within parliament, stating that this was opposed by 
Iran’s Constitution. This did not work out the way Kashani had 
planned as the people of Iran went on strike in support of 
Mossadeq, chanting “Mossadeq or death” bringing business to a 
standstill. The Majlis listened to their constituents and voted in 
favor of Mossadeq almost unanimously. This was an embarrassing 
defeat for Kashani and his allies. Additionally, the very next day 
Mossadeq replaced one of Kashani’s closest allies, Chief of Police 
Colonel Kamal, which was another major blow to Kashani’s 
political stature.46 Kashani began to realize that fighting Mossadeq 
politically or legally was almost impossible, but this did not deter 
him. Ayatollah Kashani had been embarrassed and could feel his 
power slipping through his grasp. This was enough to motivate 
                                                                                                         
Ulama’s income was paid by the guilds in exchange for religious services and 
duties. 
45 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D'Etat Against Mosaddeq,” in 
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, eds. Mark J. Gasiorowski 
and Malcolm Byrne, 227-260 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 243. 
Mozzafar Baqa’I was a member of the National Front and Hossein Makki was 
the National Front leader and a close ally of Kashani. 
46 Abrahamian, The Coup, 30. 
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Kashani and his men to partake in subversive and covert operations 
aimed at the removal of Mohammad Mossadeq, in order to 
reinstate the level of power he so desperately yearned for. It was at 
this point that Kashani and his followers allied with General 
Zahedi, the Shah, and the US/British alliance. 47 
Traditionally in Iran the Ulama were supporters of the 
monarchy, so while Kashani may have been the most prominent 
and aggressive cleric involved in Mossadeq’s ousting, he was not 
the only one. Another major player in Iran’s religious circle who 
took part in overthrowing Iran’s Prime Minister was Ayatollah 
Seyyed Mohammad Behbahani. A son of one of the two leading 
religious figures in Iran’s constitutional movement, the pro-British 
Behbahani became personally close to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
during the Shah’s rise to power. In fact, the two became so close 
that Behbahani came to be the Shah’s religious protector and a 
very close ally early on. Even though Behbahani’s position as 
Ayatollah ostensibly meant he stood for religious piety and 
incorruptibility, he seemingly had no issue accepting funds directly 
from the Shah to continue promoting his authority. The Ayatollah 
was known to have “the reputation of being quite unscrupulous and 
corrupt, ready to sell his influence on the bazaars to the highest 
bidder.”48 As the situation between the Shah and Prime Minister 
Mossadeq began to erode, Behbahani took an active role in 
rallying support for the Shah and promoting opposition to 
Mossadeq through the creation and utilization of powerful street 
demonstrations.49 While Behbahani’s close relationship with the 
Shah and the power he could offer may have been enough to impel 
him to rally Southern Tehran into action, the payments he received 
from the CIA assured it. Behbahani also had the support of fellow 
clerics such as his son-in-law Ayatollah Bahaeddin Nouri and 
Seyyed Jalaleddin Firouzabadi. 50 
                                                
47 Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, 30-32. 
48 Ibid., 39. 
49 Ibid., 301. 
50 Ibid., 39. 
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The final critical member of the Ulama with CIA ties was 
also a close friend and ally of Ayatollah Behbahani, the powerful 
preacher by the name of Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi. Falsafi 
held strong influence with the traditional classes within Iran. A 
longstanding opponent of both Mossadeq and Kashani, Falsafi 
would eventually ally himself with Kashani based on their shared 
anti-Mossadeq views. He was staunchly anti-Communist and used 
the pulpit to spread anti-Mossadeq propaganda, which suggested 
that Mossadeq was paving the way for the Tudeh Party to take 
power and implement Communism in Iran. Why was it though that 
Falsafi was so adamantly anti-Mossadeq and what motivated him 
to sway the masses towards the Prime Minister’s overthrow? This 
was largely due to Mossadeq’s strong stance in favor of 
nationalism, and in Falsafi’s eyes this diminished the religiosity of 
the Iranian population. Falsafi was also angered by Mossadeq’s 
beliefs regarding free press, since this allowed for the Communist 
Tudeh Party to publish openly.51 Finally, much like his friend 
Ayatollah Behbahani, Falsafi’s moral obligation as a member of 
the Ulama did not carry enough weight to deter him from 
accepting bribes and corruption. In his book Unseating Mossadeq: 
The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces, Fakhreddin 
Azimi describes how, “Falsafi generally had a reputation for 
willingness to adjust his fluctuating political allegiances for 
tangible gains.”52 This became clear when Falsafi began accepting 
CIA money in return for using his political and religious influence 
to mobilize the masses against Mohammad Mossadeq and to 
destabilize the National Front.53 
 
 
                                                
51 Publication by the Communist Party were particularly alarming to members of 
the ulama due to the party’s emphasis on a secular society.  
52 Fakhreddin Azimi, “Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of 
Domestic Forces,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, eds. 
Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, 27-101 (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), 68. 
53 Gasiorowski, “The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation,” 14. 
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US Government and CIA Activities within Iran 
 
Claud H. Corrigan, member of the CIA’s History Staff provides 
the CIA’s most blatant admission of guilt to date in his detailed 
history of the 1953 coup in Iran titled The Battle for Iran where he 
states:  
 
“The point that the majority of these accounts miss 
is a key one: the military coup that overthrew 
Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried 
out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign 
policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels 
of government. It was not an aggressively simplistic 
solution, clandestinely arrived at but was instead an 
official admission by both the United States and 
United Kingdom that normal, rational methods of 
international communication and commerce had 
failed. TPAJAX was entered into as a last resort.”54 
 
Kermit Roosevelt, head of the CIA’s Near East and Africa 
Division and grandson of US President Theodore Roosevelt, was 
selected by President Eisenhower, CIA Director Dulles, as well as 
the British MI6 and given complete authority to command and 
carry out the overthrow and removal of Mossadeq in Tehran by 
any means necessary. Along with the British, and other US 
operatives, Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA used a plethora of 
techniques to influence Iran’s bureaucrats, clerics, merchants, 
workers, criminals, religious community, and the remainder of the 
masses, in an effort to shift their views regarding Mossadeq, in as 
negative a way as possible, in order to undermine the massive 
amount of power he held in Iran at the time. Long before 
Roosevelt and the CIA had arrived in Iran, the British had been 
building a large network of inside agents, including key figures 
                                                
54 CIA Clandestine Service History, “The Battle for Iran,” by Claud H. Corrigan, 
undated (c. mid-1970s): 26. 
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such as the powerful Rashidyan Brothers, prominent businessmen 
and pro-British loyalists, who they could rely on for key 
intelligence information, to disseminate propaganda, and to help 
influence and mobilize the masses when needed.55 However, once 
the British had been ousted by Mossadeq in October 1952, they 
were forced to share the identities of their inside agents with the 
US and had to rely on the Americans to carry out the groundwork 
while Britain assisted behind the scenes. The CIA built some of 
their own relationships once in Iran but most of the key players 
that the CIA would utilize in the removal of Mossadeq were apart 
of Britain’s vast network of insiders. Many of the covert 
techniques and dealings that were used by the CIA can be found 
throughout Claud Corrigan’s Battle for Iran, CIA Historian and 
head coup propagandist Dr. Donald Wilber’s Clandestine Service 
History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran – November 
1952-August 1953, CIA History Staff member Scott A Koch’s 
“Zendebad, Shah!”:The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall 
of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953, 
along with the newly declassified top-secret CIA documents and 
British Memorandums from the Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X, titled Persia: 
Political Review of the Recent Crisis," September 2, 1953 which 
lie at the heart of this core analysis.  
The main focus and foundation of my analysis will rely on 
Dr. Donald Wilber’s Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran 
which provides a contemporary first-hand account of the actions 
that were taken by the CIA, including its alliance with the ulama, 
the details regarding how many of those actions were carried out, 
as well as context for the thinking that motivated them. While 
Wilber’s work provides an abundance of important information 
regarding the 1953 coup in Iran, it must be understood that a good 
portion of the original text is still redacted, therefore we do not 
                                                
55Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, 64-78. The Rashidyan Brothers 
consisted of Saifollah, Qodratollah, and Asadollah Rashidyan. These three 
powerful and wealthy Iranian businessmen had a long history of being Pro-
British loyalists and would prove to be a key part in the carrying out of the coup.  
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have all the details and certain aspects must be logically pieced 
together from information gathered from other primary documents 
and the many works of past scholars specializing in this field. 
Corrigan’s Battle for Iran and Koch’s Zenbedad Shah! will share 
the important role of helping to fill in any gaps found within 
Wilber’s work, as well as to help confirm or deny the details 
Wilber offers.  
Once the US government and the CIA had come to the 
conclusion that they would commit completely to Mossadeq’s 
removal by any means necessary, CIA Director Allen Dulles 
approved a $1,000,000 budget on April 4, 1953 “which could be 
used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the 
fall of Mossadeq.”56 According to Wilber, one of the very first 
aims of the CIA and ways in which they chose to allocate this 
money was to steadily intensify their anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah 
propaganda.57 They wanted to saturate the country as quickly and 
effectively as possible through a multi-layered approach by 
targeting the population religiously, politically, economically and 
socially. “In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct 
an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through press, 
handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken 
the Mossadeq government in any way possible.”58 The United 
States government then went on to have some of their high-ranking 
officials make public statements that made clear that American 
economic aid would not be given to Iran as long as Mossadeq was 
in power. This was done with the goal to diminish any confidence 
the people of Iran had in Mossadegh and to eliminate the idea that 
he was on good terms with the US and had the country’s 
support.5960 
                                                
56 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” 3. 
57 Ibid., vi-vii. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., vii. 
60 PressTV, “Trump tells Venezuela military to back Guaido or 'lose 
everything,” YouTube Video, 12:21, February 19, 2019. Accessed April 04, 
2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARTn0F8zzOs&feature=youtu.be. 
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Wilber’s report continues on to explain how the CIA 
played a crucial role in choosing who was to replace Mossadeq 
once he was out of the way. General Fazlollah Zahedi, who had 
previously been a member of Mossadeq’s cabinet, was seen as the 
best choice to step in as Iran’s new Prime Minister. This was due 
to Zahedi being the only reputable figure in Iran who had 
consistently spoken out in opposition to Mossadeq and at the same 
time had a large enough following to permit his new upcoming 
position as prime minister.61 While supporting Zahedi had its 
faults, such as his a pro-German stance during WWII, he had a 
solid record as a leader and combat officer, was staunchly devoted 
to the Shah, and he had an “aggressive desire to change the course 
of his country’s destiny.”62 The CIA went on to approach Zahedi 
personally and explain their goal of implementing him as the new 
prime minister along with orders that he was to name a new 
military secretariat, at which point the CIA would provide a 
“detailed staff plan of action.”63 While the CIA had chosen the 
man they wished to place as Iran’s new Prime Minister, they also 
knew that this would not be possible without the cooperation of the 
Shah. The Shah’s support would provide two requisite actions that 
were necessary to carry out a smooth transition between Mossadeq 
and Zahedi: the first was to ensure the backing of the Tehran 
military garrisons, and the second was to provide for the legal 
succession of Zahedi as Prime Minister.64  The  only  glaring issue 
with this plan of action was that the Shah of Iran was an indecisive, 
timid, and fearful man who was deathly scared of the repercussions 
of a failed coup attempt that he was complicit in.  
                                                                                                         
 
These tactics are remarkably similar to the regime change efforts by the United 
States in Venezuela in 2019. The U.S. continues to utilize economic warfare 
through the use of sanctions, along with the threat of direct military intervention, 
in order to oust the democratically elected President Nicolas Maduro and to 
replace him with a more U.S. friendly leader in Juan Guiado.  
61 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” vii. 
62 CIA, “The Battle for Iran,” 32. 
63 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” vii. 
64 Ibid. 
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It was no secret to the CIA or US government that the Shah 
would not be so easily persuaded to go along with the coup due to 
this specific set of character traits. Therefore, the CIA took it upon 
themselves to call on the Shah’s much more confident and 
aggressive twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, for some assistance 
in coercing her brother to fall in line with the joint US-British 
plans. The Princess was brought in reluctantly from Europe back to 
Tehran to push the Shah towards the removal of Mossadeq as 
prime minister and to make clear that she had been communicating 
with the US and the British who had requested her support on this 
matter. The Central Intelligence officials also decided to try to 
persuade the Shah into participation by setting up a visit from 
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who the Shah knew personally 
and had grown to like and respect. It was Schwarzkopf’s job to 
explain the upcoming plans of the CIA and to guide the Shah 
towards signing three firmans (royal decrees), which would 
provide the needed legal basis for the new change in government.65 
66 The first firman was meant to dismiss Mossadeq from office, the 
second was to appoint General Zahedi as his successor, and the 
third to call for the Army to stay loyal to the Shah. Through their 
agents in the Tehran military, the CIA made as certain as possible, 
the support of the Army for the Shah and for the acceptance of 
General Zahedi as prime minister.67 However, Corrigan’s history 
shows that Kermit Roosevelt lowered the number of firmans to be 
signed by the Shah from three to two. The first to dismiss 
Mossadeq from his position as Prime Minister and the second 
would name Zahedi as his successor. The information in the 
paragraph following this section has been completely redacted.68 
Claud Corrigan provides what looks to be two pages of a 
roughly handwritten, hard to read outline of the plans for the coup 
                                                
65 Ibid., viii.  
66 CIA, “The Battle for Iran,” 45-46. Schwarzkopf’s role here is also confirmed 
in some detail in Claud Corrigan’s The Battle for Iran. 
67 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” viii. 
68 CIA, “The Battle for Iran,” 54. 
 
 
Iranian Ulama and the CIA 
 
 
136
following page 25 in his CIA history titled The Battle for Iran. 
While there is no mention made by Corrigan explaining exactly 
what these pages are, the nature of these pages becomes quite clear 
after reading them through. The pages are numbered and lettered in 
common outline form and touch on most of the major players that 
participated in the coup. It begins with an “Introduction” followed 
by a section titled “Operational Plan.” The first subtopic is titled 
“Preliminary Support” and is followed by “Role of the Shah.” This 
shows that from the very beginning the CIA was fully aware that 
the coup would not be possible without the cooperation of the Shah 
as he would be the linchpin of the entire operation that would help 
carry public opinion and sway the masses. The “Role of the Shah” 
passage is followed by three subtopics titled “First Stage, Second 
Stage, Third Stage,” showing that the CIA planned for a steadily 
increasing effort to persuade the Shah into joining the plans. This 
may relate to the fact that US/British Intelligence knew the Shah to 
be a timid and very indecisive man who would need some rather 
strong coaxing. Section “C” is titled “Arrangement with Zahedi” 
making clear that they knew he was their choice for replacement 
from the very beginning.  The following Section “D” has the title 
of “Organ to Mount Overthrow” followed by “Organ to Mount 
Coup” which openly suggest Zahedi was the man who the 
operation would rely on to take power once Mossadeq was gone.  
The document moves on to include Zahedi’s military 
secretariat position followed by his duties and the “Actions on 
Coup Day”. The outline continues by listing the influential sectors 
of Tehran, laying out all the different groups who would need to be 
included in the plan for a successful coup to take place. These 
groups include “press and publicity,” “the Majlis,” “Political 
Elements,” “Bazaar Merchants” and most importantly for this 
study “Religious Leaders.” The documents end with a “Final 
Action” section and lastly a section titled “Estimate of Chances.” 
While this document is only a barebones outline, it does help to 
confirm the actions taken by the CIA during the coup, as the 
outline aligns almost perfectly with all of the sectors of society that 
we now know the CIA worked to influence in order to oust Prime 
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Minister Mossadeq.69 Corrigan later refers to the assumptions that 
the plan was based upon: that Zahedi was the best option for coup 
leader, the Shah must be a part of the plan (against his will if 
necessary), that the Army would follow the Shah, a legal or quasi-
legal basis must be found for the coup, that public opinion must be 
negatively aroused against Mossadeq, (next sentence excised), and 
finally that the new government must be protected from the 
Communist Tudeh Party.70 These assumptions provide context and 
direct insight into the CIA’s thinking process and planning 
procedures concerning the coup operation. 
It was not until the beginning of July 1, 1953 that the 
Director of the MI6, the British Foreign Secretary, and the British 
Prime Minister signed off on the official operation plans for  the 
coup.71 Then, finally on July 11, 1953 the Director of the CIA, the 
Secretary of State, and President Eisenhower approved the final 
plans which was an action based on National Security Council 
Report 136/1 “U.S. Policy Regarding the Present Situation in 
Iran.”72 Prior to this official authorization however, the Tehran 
station was continuing it’s covert activities and gained 
authorization to spend one million rials per week, which at the time 
was at a rate of 1 US dollar for every 90 rials ($90,000 USD), in 
order to purchase the support and cooperation of the members of 
the Majlis. Around this same time one of the two main groups 
within the CIA, who were working together but on different areas 
on the project of the coup, put together an exhaustive military plan, 
which was given to Zahedi and his military secretariat, providing 
them a detailed roadmap for action.73 In fact, the CIA was so well 
prepared that they had three separate plans of actions depending on 
the different scenarios that could potentially play out.74 The second 
group within the CIA, which was headed by Dr. Donald Wilber 
                                                
69 Ibid., 25-26. 
70 Ibid., 34. 
71 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” 19. 
72 CIA, “The Battle for Iran,” 31. 
73 CIA, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” 19. 
74 CIA, “The Battle for Iran,” 37-38. 
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(the author of this document), was given the responsibility of 
carrying out the psychological warfare portion of the plan. 75 
To further degrade the level of respect and trust the people 
of Iran felt towards Mossadeq, the US government orchestrated a 
series of three publications and speeches that were meant to 
diminish his public standing. The first of this series of publications, 
released July 9, 1953, was a copy of President Eisenhower’s letter 
written to Dr. Mossadeq on June 29, 1953 which made it explicit 
that increased economic aid for Iran would not be provided to help 
with the loss of Iran’s oil sales due to British blockades. The 
second publication came from the Secretary of State’s press 
conference on July 28, 1953, where the US stated that the growth 
and toleration of the activities of Iran’s Communist Tudeh Party 
made it almost impossible for any further US aid or assistance.76 
This was intended negatively affect US public opinion regarding 
Mossadeq as well as to shape international views of the situation. 
Finally, President Eisenhower gave a speech in Seattle at the 
Governor’s convention where he stated that, “the United States 
would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron 
Curtain.”77 This speech would prove to have a significant effect on 
the situation in Iran. The CIA, in cooperation with the Department 
of State, created and published several articles in major American 
newspapers and magazines, which they knew would be reproduced 
in Iran. The reproduction of these scripted articles would carry 
heavy influence over the opinions of Iran’s population and would 
help to slightly loosen the grip Mohammad Mossadeq held over his 
people. 
The CIA knew that outside propaganda, press publications, 
royal decrees, and pressure on the Shah would not be nearly 
enough to carry their plans to fruition. Knowing this, they turned to 
their human assets present in Iran, and more specifically the assets 
that the British had built strong relationships with over the years, 
who held powerful influence over many large sectors or Iranian 
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society. The CIA and the SIS had many contacts and inside agents 
within Iran. Due to their willingness to oppose the power of 
Mossadeq in any way they could, even at their own expense and 
while risking their own lives, there were perhaps none who were as 
important throughout Iranian society as the three Rashidyan 
brothers.78 Saifollah, Qodratollah, and Asadollah had amassed a 
huge family fortune through shipping, real estate, banking, among 
numerous other business ventures including owning and operating 
cinemas.79  The Rashidyan family had strong contacts in many 
areas including: the Majlis (parliament), armed forces, the press, 
the Ulama, politicians, street gangs, as well as other influential 
figures in Iran.80  Under the British, the brothers had been 
receiving a monthly payment of ten thousand British pounds in 
order to influence the bazaar merchants as well as to have anti-
Mossadeq articles regularly published in the newspapers.81 The 
actions of the aforementioned Rashidyan brothers proved to be 
highly effective in creating a negative image of, and building 
popular support against, Mossadeq through bribery of other 
influential figures as well as through their financing of protesters to 
carry out violent street demonstrations. The CIA also utilized the 
Rashidyan brother’s connections with the press to begin releasing 
“grey propaganda,” which attacked Mossadeq but would not credit 
the source or identify the sponsor of the information. Wilber does 
mention that the CIA had two of their own principal Iranian agents, 
whose information was to be shared with the British, but the names 
of these two agents have been redacted from Wilber’s account.82 
Wilber recounts that by mid-July 1953 a large number of 
anti-Mossadeq articles had been written by or at least outlined by 
his group. They had also provided constant guidance to the CIA 
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Art Group so that they could create a considerable number of anti-
Mossadeq cartoons and broadsheets.83 
 
 
Illustration titled, "Mossadeq, the Thief."84 
 
The goal here was to focus on building the size and potency of 
anti-Mossadeq forces, instead of merely countering those who 
supported him.85 The CIA Art Group was also commissioned to 
draw a wall poster that portrayed Zahedi being presented to the 
people of Iran by the Shah. The propaganda began to stack up very 
rather quickly and was then taken to Iran, where on July 22, 1953 
it was distributed to CIA and SIS agents to be used throughout all 
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the avenues of the press which the CIA had control over.86 It is 
now known that the CIA held influence over four-fifths of the 
newspapers in Tehran of which they were able to make very 
effective use of in many different ways.87 The Tehran Station 
claimed that about 20 local newspapers “were now in violent 
opposition to Mossadeq.”88 Wilber goes on to explain that the 
CIA’s propaganda efforts took another turn as the anti-Mossadeq 
campaign had already gained traction and was now building steam. 
Instead of strictly releasing articles and cartoons that attacked 
Mossadeq, they made a push to disseminate articles and cartoons 
that supported and positively portrayed the Shah. The CIA 
provided a personal loan of $45,000 to the owner of a newspaper, 
whose name and newspaper title have been redacted, in hopes that 
this would make him more conformable to their efforts. Asadollah 
Rashidyan was given the propaganda which had been prepared by 
CIA agents, who then passed the articles along to his press 
connections, and by the end of the month the new campaign was 
up and running.89   
After being pressured so strongly by his own sister and 
after several personal meetings with Kermit Roosevelt, the 
pressure had become so forceful that it was easier for the Shah to 
sign the royal firmans, which he did on August 15, 1953, than it 
would have for him to refuse.90 The coup was planned for the very 
next day. However, the information contained in the plans had 
been leaked to Mossadeq, who began to prepare. When the Shah’s 
bodyguard arrived to arrest Mossadeq, he was outnumbered and 
overpowered by military forces that were loyal to the prime 
minister and the coup failed. Knowing that this was a possibility, 
the CIA had arranged a protected hiding place for General Zahedi. 
The Shah had also decided to leave Iran for Baghdad, as he 
thought he would not survive if he stayed in the country. With the 
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help of a secret CIA arranged press conference and through covert 
CIA printing facilities, on August 17, 1953 General Zahedi 
announced to the people of Iran that he was now their legal prime 
minister and that Mossadeq had tried to carry out an illegal coup 
against him. Agents of the CIA began sending out large numbers 
of photographs of the firmans stating that Mossadeq had been 
dismissed from his position and that Zahedi was now prime 
minister.91 
 
 
Mohammad Reza Shah (right) shaking hands with General 
Zahedi (left). 92 
 
This propaganda worked precisely as it was intended and very 
seriously affected the views of the Iranian people. Iranian citizens 
were angered and shocked at what they were hearing and at the 
fact that the Shah had been forced to flee the country and was 
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exiled to Italy for some time.93 Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA did 
not believe that the coup was lost, so they contacted the Shah and 
encouraged him to make public statements that would encourage 
the Army and the Iranian population to accept Zahedi as their new 
prime minister.94 
After the first coup attempt, which was shut down by 
Mossadeq’s supporters including the Communist Tudeh Party, and 
after Mossadeq himself received leaked information about it, the 
CIA’s Tehran station had to reexamine their plans before moving 
on with the second attempt.95 The CIA no longer saw the operation 
as a military coup, but rather as a political action to help move the 
Iranian military away from Mossadeq’s now illegal government 
and place them behind Zahedi and the Shah. Roosevelt, with the 
Shah’s signed firmans, knew that he had two very powerful pieces 
of paper in hand and knew that if he could publicize and 
disseminate this information quickly that Mossadeq would not be 
able to hold on to his power for long.96 They also knew that they 
would need a much larger support group from the local military 
units, local tribal leaders, and the religious community if they 
intended to be successful this time. The CIA sent an Iranian 
Colonel (name excised) to meet with Colonel (name excised), who 
was the commanding officer of a local garrison, in hopes of 
persuading him to declare his support for the Shah. Zahedi, along 
with another CIA agent were sent to meet a Brigadier General, 
again whose name is not provided, to request his support for the 
Shah as well. Following these requests for support, the CIA once 
again stepped up its propaganda efforts by sending guidance to the 
stations in Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, and 
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Beirut, stating that General Zahedi’s government is now the only 
legal one in Iran.97 Corrigan tells us that the CIA had their plan of 
action for the second attempt already arranged. The idea was to 
recruit a group of officers in key positions that would enable them 
to take over army headquarters, Radio Tehran, the homes of 
Mossadeq and his associates, police headquarters, the telephone 
exchange, the Majlis building, along with a handful of other key 
locations and the arrests of prominent pro-Mossadeq figures in the 
military, government, and the press.98 The Tehran Station received 
news from Kermanshah on August 18, 1953 that would greatly 
help their cause. Colonel Abbas Farzanegan had returned with 
news that Colonel Bakhtiar had agreed to march on Tehran to 
support the Shah and oppose Mossadeq.99 With these important 
posts locked down and key figures in on the plot, the coup was 
sure to be a success. Roosevelt, the CIA, and Zahedi now felt that 
they were prepared with enough support to come back and carry 
out a successful coup against Mossadeq.  
Strong signs of reemerging support for the Shah in Tehran 
spurred along by the CIA propaganda had now become obvious.100 
According to Wilber, a pro-Shah demonstration originated in the 
bazaar area of Tehran on August 19, 1953,“partially spontaneously 
revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah…”101 While a pro-
Shah demonstration did break out, whether it was spontaneous and 
due to the “fundamental prestige of the Shah” is unlikely as many 
pro-Shah and anti-Mossadeq demonstrations were created and led 
by CIA operatives, religious clerics, political parties, and through a 
handful of other influential groups or leaders who were being paid 
for and/or were paying others for their participation. Wilber does 
go on to mention that certain assets from the CIA’s station in 
Tehran contributed to the start of the pro-Shah demonstrations, 
which seems to be in keeping with what is known regarding paid 
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demonstrations. The CIA ordered their sub-agents to gather their 
paid followers and begin taking over key locations. Their first stop 
was to set fire to the offices of the Bakhtar-i-Emruz, a leading 
newspaper which was anti-Shah and strongly pro-Mossadeq. They 
moved on to ransack the offices of the leading Tudeh newspapers 
as well. The Rashidyan brothers were then told to call for their 
followers to take over Radio Tehran, which they later did 
successfully. Members of the Iranian Zuhrkhaneh (House of 
Strength a traditional Persio-Islamic gym), including acrobats, 
weightlifters, and wrestlers were at the head of the masses. They 
had specifically chosen Shaban Bimohk (the Brainless) Jaffari, 
Iran’s most famous athlete to lead the crowd, which created an 
absolute frenzy. The people of Iran idolized the athletes of the 
Zuhrkhaneh in a similar manner to the American idolization of 
football, baseball, and basketball players. Therefore, this was a 
very effective move on behalf of the CIA and the Rashidyan 
brothers to play on Iranian popular culture to promote their 
participation in the coup.102 Then a leading Colonel, whose name 
has been redacted, took control of a tank, along with members of 
the disbanded Imperial Guard, took over trucks and began driving 
through the streets and came together at Sepah Square in 
Tehran.103 
The demonstrators soon came face to face with the Army 
units in Tehran whose job it was to disperse them. The soldiers 
began firing hundreds of warning shots over the crowds.104 The 
troops finally realized they could not quell the crowds and refused 
to fire on their people and so joined the pro-Shah demonstrations 
making it clear that the Shah’s supporters had taken over Tehran. 
This set the stage for the CIA’s original course of action for 
carrying out the coup. The crowds then took over the press and 
propaganda offices, along with the central telegraph office. CIA 
operatives used control over the telegraph offices to send telegrams 
to the provinces to call for the people to stand up in support of the 
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Shah.105 Radio Tehran was now the main target as this was the 
fastest and most far-reaching way to spread the news that the 
Shah’s troops were now in Tehran and to convince the people of 
Iran to support Zahedi’s government.106 Understanding their 
control over the situation, the CIA station then prompted Zahedi to 
come out of hiding and continue with the CIA’s original plans with 
the Shah’s signed firmans in hand. Zahedi was picked up by a tank 
and driven to Radio Tehran headquarters to broadcast a reading of 
the Shah’s firmans and to declare that the government was now 
his.107 Zahedi, with CIA asset assistance, then took over the offices 
of the General Staff, they seized Mossadeq’s home, searched then 
trashed the place, and finally they arrested all of the pro-Mossadeq 
politicians and officers.108 It was now official, as of August 19, 
1953 that General Fazlollah Zahedi was the new Prime Minister of 
Iran.  
Upon hearing that the coup was successful the Shah 
remarked, “I knew my people loved me.”109 Dr. Wilber explains 
that the Shah soon returned to Iran where he received a warm and 
popular reception from the Iranian people. It seems that the Shah 
was moved emotionally by this response and the fact that his 
people and the Army had stood up to Dr. Mossadeq and had 
revolted against the Communist Tudeh Party. According to Wilber, 
this was the first time in the Shah’s life that he felt that he had the 
total support of Iran’s population as well as the Army.110 While the 
Shah was basking in his newfound glory and success, he was well 
aware of the fact that none of this would have been possible 
without the help of Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA. According to 
Roosevelt, the Shah proclaimed that ““I owe my throne to God, my 
people, my army and to you!” By ‘you’ he (the Shah) meant me 
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and the two countries—Great Britain and the United States—I was 
representing. We were all heroes.”111 With all of this done, the 
CIA’s work was not yet complete. In order to help Zahedi succeed 
and continue to pay his staff until the United States government 
could provide large-scale aid, the CIA covertly provided Zahedi 
with $5,000,000 within two days of his supposition of power.112 
Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA had successfully organized, 
orchestrated, and carried out the first overthrow of a government 
using covert operations in the CIA’s history, which would 
drastically change the course of Iran’s and the world’s history 
forever.113 Moreover, As Claud Corrigan so casually puts it 
regarding the state of Iran after the coup: “A successful TPAJAX 
left behind a good deal of debris to clean up, plus not a few 
complications.”114 
 
The Role of the CIA and Iran’s Ulama 
 
While understanding the CIA’s actions and level of involvement in 
the 1953 coup in Iran is crucial to understanding US, British, and 
Iranian history, as well as current US-Iranian relations, this is a 
history that has been very thoroughly examined and studied by 
many of the top scholars in this field. What has not been detailed to 
a sufficient extent is the of the role of Iran’s religious clerics in the 
coup and their relationships and interactions with the CIA, and the 
effect that their cooperation had on the coup’s final outcome. This 
will offer a much more nuanced understanding of the 1953 coup in 
Iran and will also provide additional context from which to view 
the events that occurred. The plans carried out here will also shed 
light on the inner workings and guidelines that can be used to carry 
out a coup in almost any society, but more importantly will expose 
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the role played by Iran’s own religious leaders in ousting their 
democratically elected prime minister.  
While the many different groups who worked in 
cooperation with the CIA or under the influence of their subagents 
played key roles in the 1953 coup, and without a doubt facilitated 
its outcome, there was no single group who had a more crucial role 
than the Ulama. I argue that there was no single group who had the 
potential to play such a key role in these events as did Iran’s 
religious elite. This is because no other sector of Iran’s society 
could possibly hold the power and influence over the masses like 
the country’s clerics. Relied upon as spiritual leaders and 
interpreters the Quran and hadith, as well serving as custodians of 
most of Iran’s social welfare systems, it is no wonder that the 
influence of the Iranian clerics was far greater than any other group 
involved. Having studied Iran’s history thoroughly and having had 
years of experience within Iran’s culture, and MI6 held a deep 
understanding of the Ulama’s role in Iranian society, which they 
relayed to their CIA counterparts thus playing upon the 
weaknesses and cultural norms within Iran and placed an 
enormous amount of focus on gaining the cooperation of some of 
Iran’s highest-level clerics.   
Dr. Donald Wilber’s account shows that from the start the 
CIA knew they wanted to target Iran’s Ulama. Wilber states that 
the funds provided by the CIA were meant to carry out an 
“increasingly intensified propaganda effort” through use of the 
local media, the passing out of pamphlets, and through the “Tehran 
Clergy” in an effort to diminish the power of the Mossadeq’s 
government.115 Corrigan’s history also provides evidence that the 
Ulama were a CIA target from the beginning with the handwritten 
coup outline/plan he provided that lists “Religious Leaders.”116 
There were many instances where members of the Ulama were 
used or participated in actions geared towards swaying the 
thoughts of Iran’s public. The first to be examined is an instance 
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offered by Dr. Wilber which suggests that when Dr. Mossadeq 
dissolved the Majlis, which they considered a clear abuse of the 
constitution in order to gain single-handed control, this gave the 
CIA an issue over which they could attack Mossadeq. The Tehran 
Station of the CIA reported that their agents made numerous 
efforts to project the illegality of the dissolution of the Majlis both 
before and after it took place. Wilber comments that every 
declaration made by religious clerics during this time strongly 
stressed this idea. While he does not explicitly say that these 
religious leaders were acting in line with CIA guidelines, it is 
understood that many of the religious clerics were under CIA 
influence and were following their themes. So, while this particular 
instance may be mere coincidence, it is likely not.117  
Prior to the first coup attempt, the CIA set out to discredit 
the people’s belief in Mossadeq. Their first goal was to create 
divisions within the National Front Party by targeting the popular 
Ayatollah Kashani. The CIA began spreading propaganda that 
attacked Kashani directly in order to create problems between 
himself and Mossadeq. For examples, they issued a cartoon in 
Iranian newspapers during the fall of 1952 implying that Mossadeq 
was sexually molesting Kashani. The propaganda did indeed help 
to create a gap between the two as Kashani began to turn on 
Mossadeq by the fall of 1952, and had broken ties with him in 
early 1953.118 This was a major blow for Mossadeq because the 
group that Kashani led, known as the Warriors of Islam, included 
the bazaar merchants along with many of the leading clerics and 
support from these two groups together has been vital to Iranian 
governments throughout history.119 This quote from the memoirs 
of Prince Manucher Farmanfarmaian, sixth son of one of the most 
prominent politicians of his time the Qajar Prince Abdol-Hossein 
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Farmanfarma, paints a picture of the powerful relationship between 
the two and illustrates their influence: “It (the bazaar) was a world 
unto itself, impregnable to the army, which could not easily enter 
its labyrinthine alleys. The leaders of the bazaar were weighty 
men, often tightly allied with the mollahs, and they could start riots 
or shut down the bazaar to instant political effect.”120 
Due to this split, Kashani and his followers began voting 
against Mossadeq in parliament and created a deadlock on many 
cases, limiting Mossadeq’s power for a time. The CIA also wanted 
to gain the cooperation of another leader outside of the National 
Front and began giving money indirectly to Ulama member 
Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, and likely to other leading clerics as 
well. Although the CIA was not able to make direct contact with 
Kashani, they were able to fund him indirectly. Around this time it 
is also likely that the Tehran Station provided money to the leading 
cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani, who played a 
monumental role in the coup.121 Behbahani’s role started well 
before the street demonstrations as he supposedly wrote and sent 
out “black” letters, under the pretense that they had been sent by 
members of the Tudeh Party, to other clergy members threatening 
to hang them in the streets.122 This was intended to build popular 
support amongst the religious community against Mossadeq and 
the Tudeh party.   
In the weeks leading up to the first coup attempt the CIA 
had their Iranian agents make “black” phone calls to many clerical 
leaders throughout Tehran, which were incredibly threatening in 
nature, in the name of the Tudeh Party. They also conducted a 
“sham bombing” at one of the mullah’s personal homes, which 
was followed up by sending a “stink bomb” into a Tehran mosque. 
The CIA were likely responsible for attacks that took place on 
other mosques as well but there are no official records to support 
this. The aim here was to continue to try to turn the religious 
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leaders against Mossadeq, in order to make use of the incredible 
influence they held over the population.123 Following the failure of 
the first coup attempt, the CIA made an attempt to reach out to the 
leading Shi’a cleric from Qom, Ayatollah Borujerdi, by sending a 
Tehran cleric (name excised) in an effort to persuade him to 
declare a holy war against the all communists in Iran with the pro-
Shah newspapers ready and waiting to issue the story immediately. 
He was also asked to build a large demonstration based on the 
theme that it was now time for the army officers, soldiers and the 
people of Iran to rally behind both religion and the Shah.124 While 
he never agreed to issue such a declaration this shows yet another 
effort by the CIA to include a leading cleric in the coup.125 
However, there is conclusive evidence that shows the CIA working 
directly with members of Tehran’s Ulama regarding when to stage 
the coup. In The Battle For Iran, Claud Corrigan explains:  
 
Roosevelt had hoped that it would be possible to 
emphasize the religious aspects of the 
demonstration to be held the 19th, but if this was to 
be done, the mullahs wanted to hold it on Friday, 21 
August, which was a religious festival day. For a 
number of reasons, not the least of which was the 
widespread rumor that the arrested officers were to 
be hung on the 20th, the operation could not be held 
off the two extra days the religious leaders 
wanted.126  
 
The names of the clerics that Corrigan is referring to are not 
offered but may very well be included in the redacted portions that 
immediately precede and follow this passage. This quote once 
again confirms how seriously the CIA took the influence of the 
clerics, as they made sure to place emphasis on the religious aspect 
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of these demonstrations knowing that this would inflame the 
crowds far more than any political protest ever could.  
On the morning of August 19, 1953, two CIA officers 
delivered $10,000 dollars to one of Kashani’s men to pass along 
for Kashani to use as payment for protestors to create and 
participate in street demonstrations that were both anti-Mossadeq 
and pro-Shah in form.127 Corrigan confirms that many of the street 
demonstrators on this day were those that Kashani was paying 200 
tomans (about $26.65) each for their participation.128 While 
Kashani received large amounts of money from the CIA, the 
operatives claim that Behbahani was the leading figure behind the 
demonstrations and he himself had received large amounts of 
funds from the Tehran Station.129 He had actually received so 
much money that the expression “Behbahani dollars” was even 
used many years after to refer to the money that was used to hire 
the street demonstrators.130 During an interview one CIA member 
recalls how “so much American currency found its way into 
Tehran’s black market during the coup that the exchange rate fell 
from over one hundred rials to the dollar to under fifty”131 Koch 
cements the fact that the Ulama were absolutely key in carrying 
out the powerful demonstrations which came together and finally 
toppled Mossadeq when he states: 
 
[First line excised] the influence of the mullahs on 
the demonstration was clear. Holy men had 
galvanized many of the poor of South Tehran by 
hammering on the themes that the Soviet-backed 
Communists were taking over, the Shah was gone, 
and Mossadeq was to blame. The streets of Tehran, 
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which had belonged to the Tudeh 24 hours earlier, 
now belonged to a different crowd.132 
 
In March 2018 a British memorandum titled, “Persia: Review of 
the Recent Crisis,” was released which provided a detailed account 
of the events that occurred in Tehran between August 19th-21st. 
This key document provides the entire list of events that took place 
leading up to the powerful anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah street 
demonstrations in Tehran and the taking over of Mossadeq’s 
personal residence the day of the coup. While this memorandum 
contains a host of completely relevant and vital information 
regarding the unfolding of the coup events, this is not what makes 
this document so crucial. What makes it so important is a section, 
which had been excised for security reasons until only recently, 
and it is this section that provides irrefutable evidence that places 
responsibility on members of the Tehran Ulama, specifically 
naming Ayatollah Behbahani, for receiving US funds for their 
complicity with the CIA in the 1953 coup. The recently released 
passage states:  
 
According to reliable reports received on 10th 
August, the American Embassy had secretly handed 
over large sums of money to certain influential 
people, including AYATULLAH BIHBIHANI, the 
well-known ecclesiastic. Certain sources in close 
contact with General ZAHIDI stated that all plans 
had been laid for a military Coup d/Etat, and that 
the American Embassy was directing and 
encouraging them in order to overthrow the 
government. 133 
 
The memorandum later names Behbahani specifically as being 
solely responsible for the street demonstrations the day of the coup 
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by saying that: “only the commanders of regiments, the Chief of 
Police, and Ayatullah BIHBIHANI, who was responsible for 
organizing demonstrations, knew of the plan, and the Tudeh had 
therefore no chance of discovering the plot beforehand.”134 This 
single document has confirmed what has long been assumed and 
pieced together by scholars: that certain members of Iran’s 
religious leadership, were without a doubt working hand in hand 
with the US Central Intelligence Agency to take out their 
democratically elected Prime Minister, in exchange for money and 
the possibility of positions of political power. It must be made 
clear however, that the complicity of the Ulama in the 1953 coup 
was not widespread and was limited to a few key members. The 
Iranian Ulama have a long history of anti-interventionist activity at 
multiple points throughout Iranian history. One prominent example 
was the actions taken by members of the Ulama in the successful 
protest and boycott of the creation of a British monopoly on 
Iranian tobacco in 1892 during the Tobacco Protest.135 
  
Conclusion 
 
Iran’s religious clerics enjoy overwhelming power and influence 
over the majority of the Iranian population. This is the case for two 
reasons. The first being Islam is a politico-religious system that 
blends the realities of the secular world with the holy. The second 
reason is the traditional role of the religious community in Shia 
Islam who serve as interpreters of the Quran and hadith and 
perform essential services for the community. For many Iranian 
people, the word of their Ulama members is law and since there 
were a significant number of these religious elites who were 
involved in the coup, of which there may very well have been 
more than we have record of, their contributions towards the 
                                                
134 Ibid., 5. 
135 Michael Axworthy, "Iran: The Revolution That Shook the World," America's 
Current Affairs & Politics Magazine, February 13, 2019. Accessed April 05, 
2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2019/02/iran-
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outcome is immeasurable. I therefore conclude that the 1953 Coup 
D’état in Iran would not have been possible without the direct 
participation and complicity of Iran’s religious leaders backed by 
the leadership, guidance, finances, and organizing abilities of the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA needed the 
Ulama, just as much, if not more than the Ulama needed the CIA. 
Were it not for the “grey” and “black” propaganda of the CIA, 
financial bribes offered by them, the fake phone calls to the clerics 
by the Tehran station, the destruction of certain Mosques, and the 
creation of street demonstrations, all involving and motivating the 
Ulama to act, the outcome in Iran may well have been a very 
different one. Had the CIA not had the direct or indirect 
cooperation of the Ulama in Iran, Mossadeq may have stayed in 
power, the Shah may have never had the chance to become a 
dictator much to the detriment of Iran’s people for 26 years. It is 
then conceivable that the 1979 fundamentalist Iranian Revolution, 
headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, would have never gained traction 
or been necessary in the first place. 
Perhaps the most valuable information that is provided 
from studying the 1953 Iranian coup is the blueprint created by the 
CIA and MI6 that would be replicated time and again the world 
over. The CIA would go on to create a pattern of covert regime 
change in countries all around the world. Starting in Guatemala 
only one year later in 1954, the CIA began an operation known as 
PBSUCCESS where they successfully removed the democratically 
elected President Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán and installed 
military leadership which lead to the deaths of over 100,000 
Guatemalan citizens.136 The CIA then moved on to the Congo in 
1961 where they facilitated the removal of Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba and the implementation of a pro-US leader.137 Then 
again where the CIA took part in creating the conditions which 
                                                
136 ColdWarWarriors, “Arbenz & the CIA, Guatemala 1950’s,” YouTube Video, 
7:24, February 24, 2009. Accessed April 07, 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rb7XaF1rs1E. 
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lead to the 1973 Chilean coup which removed President Salvadore 
Allende and replaced him with the brutal dictator Augusto 
Pinochet.138 Indeed, as of early 2019, all the signs and symptoms 
of US backed regime change are present yet once again in 
Venezuela. The US continues to use economic warfare through 
sanctions and by pressuring allies into not dealing with Venezuela 
in order to force their hand, seemingly, and once again, for an 
opportunity to control their most valuable resource: oil. 
 
  
                                                
138 CIA, "CIA Activities in Chile," June 19, 2013. Accessed April 7, 2019. 
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